Major Miscalculations: How a War with Iran Could Become Washington’s Greatest Strategic Deviation

By Dr. Tarik Tlaty
President of the Moroccan Center for Strategic Studies and Research

In international strategy, major mistakes rarely arise from a lack of power; they stem from a misreading of reality. Empires are seldom defeated because they are weak, but because they interpret the world incorrectly at decisive moments. From this perspective, the possibility of the United States sliding into a confrontation with Iran — despite its inherent complexities — appears to be a classic example of what theorists of international relations describe as “strategic deviation”: when a major power becomes drawn into a secondary conflict at a time when it should be focusing on a far more consequential rival.

Over the past two decades, the primary challenge occupying decision-making circles in the United States has been the rise of China as the only geopolitical competitor capable of reshaping the global balance of power. This concern has translated into a variety of strategies aimed at containing Chinese influence, particularly as Beijing expanded its economic presence across Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Through large-scale investments, infrastructure projects, and long-term partnerships, China has succeeded in building extensive networks of influence throughout the developing world.

Yet this strategic focus did not prevent Washington from falling into a dangerous paradox. While closely monitoring China’s movements across the Global South, the United States has simultaneously been drifting toward escalation with Iran — a country widely regarded as a strategic partner of China. Although such a conflict may not carry the same global strategic weight as the U.S.–China rivalry, it possesses the potential to drain enormous political and military resources.

Part of the problem lies in what might be called the “illusion of a short war.” In certain policy circles, the prospect of military confrontation with Iran has been framed as a limited operation: targeted strikes against military or nuclear facilities, a controlled Iranian response, followed by a rapid return to a state of mutual deterrence. This scenario rests on two fundamental assumptions.

The first assumption is that American military strikes would be capable of significantly degrading Iran’s strategic capabilities within a short period of time. The second assumption is more daring: that external pressure might trigger internal unrest within Iran, and that segments of Iranian society — which have previously taken to the streets in economic and political protests — might seize the moment to exert pressure on the regime.

However, this reading ignores a well-known historical principle: societies experiencing internal tensions often unite quickly when faced with an external threat. Numerous historical cases demonstrate that external pressure can strengthen regime cohesion rather than weaken it.

In the Iranian case, experience suggests that the political system established after the Iranian Revolution has built a complex architecture of resilience. This structure is rooted in a strong network of security and military institutions, a political doctrine centered on resisting external pressure, and an extended regional influence that enables Iran to project conflict beyond its geographical borders.

For this reason, any military confrontation with Iran cannot be analyzed solely through the lens of direct strikes. It must also be examined through the broader network of regional balances surrounding the country. Iran does not perceive itself as an isolated state but rather as a regional actor possessing multiple instruments of influence that can be used to increase the cost of confrontation for its adversaries.

Herein lies the contradiction within American strategy. On the one hand, Washington seeks to redirect its resources toward the long-term strategic competition with China. On the other hand, it risks becoming entangled in a prolonged confrontation in the Middle East — precisely the scenario successive U.S. administrations have sought to avoid since the costly experiences of the Iraq War and the War in Afghanistan.

Domestically, such a scenario places a figure like Donald Trump in a complex political position. Trump built a significant portion of his political narrative on criticizing America’s prolonged military interventions abroad. Yet he could find himself — even within the framework of a limited confrontation — facing a conflict that carries the risk of unpredictable escalation.

Should such a confrontation evolve into an open or protracted conflict, the costs would not be purely military. They would also be economic and geopolitical. The Middle East is not merely a theater of political conflict; it is a central hub in the global energy system and a crucial crossroads for international trade routes. Any major instability in the region could trigger a chain of consequences extending far beyond its geographic boundaries.

For this reason, the real question extends beyond Iran or the United States alone. It concerns the decision-making mechanisms of major powers. How can a country possessing the world’s most sophisticated intelligence and military apparatus drift toward assessments that underestimate both the complexity of its adversary and the capacity of regional conflicts to evolve into global crises?

Strategic history is filled with wars that began as limited operations only to become turning points in the international system. If the twenty-first century is indeed witnessing a profound reshaping of global power balances, then the greatest mistake a superpower can make is not necessarily entering a losing war — but entering a war that distracts it from its true strategic contest.